Government agencies typically have a certain freedom to choose among dierent possible courses of action. This paper studies agency decision-making on priorities in a principal-agent framework with multi-tasking. The agency head (the principal) has discretion over part of the agency's budget to incentivize his sta (agents) in the pick-up of cases. The head is concerned with society's benets from the agency's overall performance, but also with the organization's public image as formed from pursuing high-prole cases and various non-case specic activities. Based on their talent and the contracts oered by the head, sta ocials choose which type of task to pursue: complex major, yet dicult to complete cases with an uncertain outcome, or basic minor and simple cases with a high probability of success. The size of the agency's discretionary budget inuences not only the scale, but also the type of tasks it will engage in. Social welfare is non-monotonic and discontinuous in the agency's budget. Small changes in the budget may cause extensive restructuring from major to minor tasks, or vice versa. A budget cut can increase welfare more than too little extra budget would. For lower binding budgets, the head continues to suboptimally incentivize work on complex tasks, when the agency should have shifted down to simpler tasks. In determining the discretionary space of the agency head, the budget-setter can limit the extraction of resources, but thereby also reduces the benets from the head's superior information on how to incentivize the ocials. Antitrust authorities serve as one illustration of policy implications for institutional design, including optimal budgetting and agency mergers. JEL-codes : D02, L44, M52
Introduction
Government agencies are organizations in the machinery of government with a certain amount of autonomy and independence from political inuence in the execution of their functions in oversight and administration. Examples are central banks, intelligence agencies, internal revenue services, antitrust authorities, public prosecutors, energy regulators and gambling control boards. The laws these institutions enforce typically leave them considerable freedom to choose among dierent possible courses of action according to their own judgment. Principally tasked with decision making in specic cases, government agencies have varying levels of discretion over how to prioritize potential matters to pursue, how to conduct investigations, and what remedies to impose upon a nding of a breach of law. The agencies also have other, non-case specic concerns of impression management, that is, self-presentation through professional communication and public relations directed at forming the organization's public image. To a government agency, image is particularly important, as their tasks, be it controlling ination, terrorism, money laundering, cartels or gambling schemes, by their nature often are enigmatic to the general public. Impression management helps secure public support for the agency's stately goals and tasks -and so indirectly also its future budget.
Like all organizations, government agencies are networks of principal-agent relationships, and therefore riddled with agency issues that inuence the allocation of resources over various tasks. Economic theory has long studied goal mismatches and incentive-provision schemes in principal-agent relationships within rms.
1 While there have been calls for the introduction of incentive contracts into public organizations as well, the canonical principal-agent model is not directly transferable to non-prot organizations.
2 Government agencies dier from prot-maximizing rms in important aspects, including external (political) resource assignment and dicult measurement of output. These characteristics allow for other civil servant incentives than just serving social welfare to take hold, among which mission-motivation, empire-building and conformity are known to induce suboptimal spending, bureaucratic slack and promotion of third-party interest.
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In this paper we study in an agency-context how variations in its available resources can qualitatively change the range of activities the government agency will engage in, and how this will aect welfare. In a principal-agent model with multi-tasking, the agency has a two-level organizational structure. The head of the agency (principal) is concerned with society's benet from the agency's overall performance, but also with impression management. The agency's employed sta of ocials (agents) can choose, individually or as a team with some autonomy, from various types of activities. The tasks vary in their expertise requirements and yield of social welfare gains upon completion, the probability of which is a function of sta eort and complexity. The ocials are all permanently employed at a xed wage, but the head has discretion over part of the agency's budget to oer additional rewards to 1 See Prendergast (1999) , Laont & Martimort (2002) and Lazear (2009) . 2 See Barzelay (2001) . 3 See Niskanen (1968) , Peltzman (1976) , Wilson (1991) and Leaver (2009). further incentivize his sta. These variable contracts can contain explicit incentive pay, but typically also the value of future career perspectives, in-and outside the agency, schooling opportunities, or tertiary benets ocials enjoy, such as participation in the agency's international network, research projects, summer courses or conferences abroad. Depending on the contract oered, the agency ocials either pursue the more demanding and complex high-prole cases, or opt to do simpler basic tasks.
The head extracts the budget residue that ends up not being used as rewards for the sta 's activities for other purposes, which typically do not have comparable social benets. This residue decreases both in the size of the rewards and in the probability of the tasks being completed successfully.
We identify how under these circumstances the size of the head's discretionary budget qualitatively aects the type of activities a government agency will perform. Small changes in the budget can have drastic consequences for society's benets from agency performance. Depending on the institution's status, discretionary budget changes over certain thresholds can cause extensive restructuring, both away from and towards activities that require more expertise and yield a major outcome. Social welfare is non-monotonic and discontinuous in the budget, as a result, so that at a jump discontinuity an innitesimal budget cut may lead to a substantial increase in welfare, beyond the direct fund savings. At other budget levels, however, more discretionary spending increases welfare. For lower binding budgets, for example, the head sub-optimally incentivizes its sta to work on complex tasks for too long, while the agency should already have shifted down to simpler tasks that t the limited budget.
These insights underline the importance of socially optimal budgeting for government agencies. They also reveal how institutional design and budget assignments can become a control tool in the arsenal of a government pursuing political goals or promoting third-party interests against the agency's public tasks.
Our approach adds to the literature on contracting in government agencies by considering both optimal and feasible agency choice of task and performance with a given budget constraint and a multilevel hierarchy. The economic literature on governmental organization has predominantly focused on political control of government agencies, as in Macey (1992) , incentives created by sharing regulatory rights between several regulatory bodies, as in Martimort (1996) , and regulatory competition or collusion with separation of powers, as in Tirole (1986) and Laont & Martimort (1999) .
We set up the objective of the agency head as a combination of social benets and self-interest. Niskanen (1968) points at the incentives of bureaucrats for self-interested budget maximization and empire-building.
4 Kreps (1997) , Murdock (2002) and Benabou & Tirole (2003) endogenize intrinsic motivation, particularly in public services and nonprot organizations. Francois (2000 Francois ( , 2003 stress the importance in these institutions of mission-motivation (a desire to promote the agency's goals) and warm-glow utility (a desire for positive appraisal). Dewatripont et al. (1999) derive implications for the optimal incentive provisions when civil servants are largely driven by career concerns and missionmotivation. Alesina & Tabellini (2007) and Alesina & Tabellini (2008) study consequences for the type 4 See also Niskanen (2007) .
of tasks a politician should delegate to career-concerned bureaucrats, if the agency head has either bureaucratic or political concerns. Makris (2009) shows, in an analysis of the eect of budget changes by a principal on a single mission-motivated agent, that the application of standard incentive contracts to government agencies may lead to a suboptimal provision of public services.
Our model provides a formal context to arguments put forward in an emerging legal and public administration literature on institutional design. Studying antitrust authorities, Hyman & Kovacic (2013) stress a need for engineering strategies for the organization of government.
5 They point at resource allocation as one key element of government agency functioning and observe that: 6 The U.S. and European competition law principals are generally formulated, whereas cases are specic, various and regularly novel. As a result, competition authorities have considerable discretion in enforcement, which is reected in vast case law.
7 Some secondary and tertiary incentive pay for ocials, on top of xed wages, is common in these agencies. Both across and within types of anti-competitive behavior, there is variation in expertise requirements and yield of social welfare gains upon completion of tasks. Monopolization or abuse of dominance are often harder, take longer and are more complex to prosecute successfully than collusion, which is per se illegal by object. Within the class of cartel investigations, there is a choice of resource allocation between cases that were brought to the attention of the authorities by a leniency application of a remorseful cartel member for amnesty and actively detecting the better organized cartels. The extent to which antitrust agencies should rely on the simpler leniency cases for the public good depends on sta talent, budget and the diculty of independent discovery.
Antitrust agencies furthermore display a number of non-case specic activities. With large interests at stake, competition cases are extensively debated, both professionally and in the popular press. Kovacic et al. (2011) document that competition authority heads have concerns other than social welfare alone, including appearing "being busy", with an eye to the media and political superiors.
Indeed do competition authority heads appear to value attention, giving interviews and contributing 5 See also Gal (2004) . 6 See, for example, Baker (2003) , Muris (2005) , Vives (2009 ), Crane (2011 ),Kovacic et al. (2011 , Kovacic & Hyman (2012) and Hyman & Kovacic (2013) .
7 See Wils (2011) .
regularly in conferences on landmark decisions or developments in enforcement tools. In addition, there are numerous competition policy outreach products, including such fancy ones as complete enacted movies, online games, and manga comic books.
8 Kovacic and co-authors express a worry that competition authorities may be wasting resources on big good-looking cases and image, while underperforming in other tasks like suggesting legislation renements and sta preparation for advanced enforcement. Our model of multitasking in the principal-agent setting founds these concerns.
Competition cases against known companies are sure to attract media attention right from the opening of the investigation -often even more so than from its conclusion. There are examples of zealously pursued high-prole cases that eventually ended without a forceful application of the law. Throughout the 1970's, for example, the US DoJ unsuccessfully prosecuted IBM for over ten years for violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, to ultimately conclude in 1982 that the case was without merit.
9 In hindsight, some of the senior ocials involved in the decision to pursue this case admitted other motivations than just expected social gain.
10 A more recent ambitious case that ultimately inated was around Google's alleged "search bias". After an extensive investigation, the FTC concluded that the evidence in the case was not enough to support a challenge of Google for monopolization under American Law. The chairman of the FTC at the time, Jon Leibowitz, explained so in a lengthy press conference that was broadcasted live on national television. The European Commission's parallel investigations for abuse of dominance by Google did continue, yet settlement were largely unsuccessful.
Competition authorities also illustrate how institutional design and budget assignments can fundamentally aect the political independence of government agencies. Gal (2004) observes that there are important dierences in the eectiveness of competition law enforcement among developing countries, even if their legal background is similar, in large part due to the fact that "[..] decision makers may not properly fund and structure the competition agency in order to reduce its ability to enforce law in practice. " Gal (2004) , p.7.
Choke of resources turning performance may be bluntly signicant in developing countries, we show that the transmission is more subtly there in well-resourced agencies as well. By edging the discretionary part of the agency's budget over certain threshold values, a budget-setter can qualitatively aect the agency's task pick-up to its liking, ranging from the pursuit of complex sure failures to low hanging fruits. The budget so acts as an indirect instrument of political control over agencies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The basic model is introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, the main results under a budget restriction are presented. Welfare implications are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, the model is extended to multiple tasks and ocials. Section 6 analyzes the 8 Some of these and other examples of marketing products can be found on the ICN's web-blog on "outreach". 9 See Fisher et al. (1985) . 10 See the contribution by Fredric M. Scherer in Slottje (1999) .
problem of the budget-setting body, such as a Ministry or Parliament, to determine the discretionary space it wants to give the head. Section 7 concludes. The proofs are given in an appendix.
A Model of Government Agency
Consider a government agency, which has a head and ocials, that can undertake several classes of activities. Each of these n tasks i ∈ I, with I = {1, ..., n}, is characterized by a double (ψ i , d i ), where ψ i ≥ 0 represents the diculty of task i and d i ≥ 0 are the social benets that the task yields upon successful completion. A complex high-prole case, with the potential of becoming a landmark case, has a high value of d i , while a simple basic task has a low value. Agency ocials dier in their skills, knowledge and talent level, captured by parameter θ ∈ [0, 1], which is known both to them and to the head.
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The agency is assigned a budget, which consist of two components. A generic part of the budget pays for such costs as employing the head and the ocials on xed wage contracts for regular work, support sta, overhead for facilities, and other expenses. An additional part D of the budget is at the head's sole discretion. He can use it for motivational rewards for his ocials to take on additional tasks, or for impression management of his agency's public image.
The agency's organizational structure is as follows. The agency head (principal) oers an upfront take-it-of-leave-it contract to each ocial, or case-handling team of ocials (agent), who subsequently undertake the actual tasks. In the following, we refer to the decision making agent as "the ocial".
A contract is a list of rewards for completing the tasks. After both the head and the ocial learn whether the task that the ocial has picked up has been completed successfully, the head pays the ocial according to the contract terms. The residual budget part D, the head has available for non-case specic activities. We begin by analyzing a representative ocial, who decides among the performance of n tasks. We then turn to the head's strategies.
In this section, we study how the restrictions on these incentive contracts aect the agency's way of prioritizing activities. Throughout this section we assume that D is sucient to nance any contract the agency head might wish to oer. In Section 3 we study the implications of a binding (discretionary) budget.
Eort chosen by the Agency's Ocial
Within the context of his contract with the agency, the ocial uses his professional expertise on the task set to choose which task he will try to complete in addition to his basic work load. The ocial cannot do more than one task at the time. In taking on a task, the ocial exerts eort a ≥ 0 at a personal cost c(a). His reward cannot be made conditional on his eort level directly, which is either unobservable or in-contractible by the head. Instead, the outcome is contracted. If task i is successfully 11 The implications of introducing asymmetric information between the head and his ocials about the talent levels of the latter are discussed in Section 7.
completed, the ocial receives the reward R i ≥ 0 specied in his contract with the agency. If no task is completed, the ocial's additional pay is zero. The oered contract is thus R ∈ R n +,0 where R i ≥ 0 for every i. The ocial can always exert no additional eort (a = 0) and ensure basic utility from regular work for himself. On top of his xed income, we normalize the ocial's reservation utility level to zero.
Eort translates into probabilities that the task worked on will be completed, depending on talent and diculty. If the ocial decides to pursue task i, the probability of completing that task is modeled to be
while the probability of completing any other task is zero.
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The ocial is risk neutral. When he decides to pursue task i, his expected utility is
The costs of his eort are set as c(a) = 1 2 γa 2 , where γ is a scaling parameter. The eort costs are increasing and convex in a, which amounts to diminishing returns of the probability of completing a task from exerting higher eort. Note that assuming γ > D implies that optimal eort will remain in the interval [0, 1), since even if the budget is fully spent on one reward, for instance R i = D, under γ > D for activity a ≥ 1 marginal costs of the ocial's eort ( ∂c ∂a ≥ γ) will be higher than marginal benets ( ∂pi(a,θ) ∂a
. In other words, if γ > D, the agency never has enough money to pay the ocial to exert eort a = 1 or more. 13
For a given talent level θ, the ocial chooses both which task to undertake and the eort he will make towards its completion, leaving the probability of obtaining a reward for completing the other tasks at zero. The ocial's payo maximization problem can thus be written as
which returns a simple rule for the ocial's choice of task to take up.
Lemma 1. Given a contract R ∈ R n +,0 , an ocial with talent level θ will undertake the task with the highest value of 12 Note that the probabilities of tasks' completion are not additively separable in θ and ψ i , so that the budget values at which the agency switches among tasks to perform under binding resource constraints in the latter chapters depend also on the talent level of the ocial. Results are not qualitatively dierent with dierent specications of the probability of task completion, as long as it is increasing in θ and decreasing in ψ i . 13 In most situations, only lower values of γ are needed to keep the ocial's eort and the probability of task completion in [0, 1) . The assumption γ > D ensures this for any values of the remaining parameters and is unnecessarily strong, for instance in cases when the agency head does not want to oer the full budget as a reward for one task. The assumption will be relaxed in some numerical examples in the text.
Moreover, under the ocial's optimal choices of eort, the probabilities of task completion will be:
if the ocial chooses to work on task i.
Proof. See Appendix.
Contracts oered by the Agency's Head
The agency head adds value to the governance of his institution by using the full information he has about the ocial's talent θ to set tailored rewards to make the ocial take up suitable tasks. The head does so by considering the expected benets that the agency's activities bring to society directly, but also the value of self-presentation through impression management. We formalize the latter in two dierent ways. First, the head derives utility just from opening cases, in particular high-prole cases that will generate a lot of exposure, independent of the question whether they will ultimately be successful or not. Driven by political pressures or career concerns, the head's discounting of the probability of success may reect that such cases possibly run longer than the head's term in oce, so that it will be his successor, not him, who will have to see these cases through. Second, the head values any residual budget that is not spent on paying rewards. He can use this residual budget for non-case specic activities that will put him and his agency in the professional and general public eye, such as giving informal opinions or speeches, appearing in the media, and marketing. The residual budget is assumed to be fully spent on such non-case specic activities. We assume that the social welfare gains from handling cases is dierent from comparable gains generated by impression management spending.
The head is risk neutral. His expected utility when employing the representative ocial performing Given his incentives, and knowing the agency ocial's optimal response, the head solves
Under the assumption that any contract is aordable in the agency budget, this leads to the following simple optimal rule for the head.
Lemma 2. If the agency's budget is non-binding, by setting the appropriate rewards, the agency head will make the ocial with talent level θ pick up the task with the highest value of
and oer him a contract (superscript 'u' for unconstrained):
where i is the task for which (2) is highest and ICC j is any value that satises the ocial's incentive constraint (1) . 16 These contracts lead to eort levels generating probabilities of task completion
Proof. See Appendix. 15 In our formal analysis, V is assumed to be strictly positive to assure a solution exists, as discussed in footnote 19. V = 0 is discussed in later sections as a limit case that does not bring new fundamental insights. 16 Note that the ocial's incentive constraint (1) is always satised by putting ICC j equal to zero.
For analytical convenience and without loss of generality, we order all possible tasks using the head's strategy of task pickup via contract design captured in (2). Note that the head will never design a contract aimed at the ocial taking on a task that is hard and brings low benets upon completion over a task with lower diculty and higher d i , since (2) decreases in both ψ i and d i . Of all possible tasks, we can thus focus only on those that are not dominated in the sense that there is no task that would be both easier and yield higher benets upon completion. The remaining tasks we can then
, so that the most dicult task is also the most benecial to society.
17
For every task, R u i is independent of the agency's budget. It is the reward for which the head's marginal benet of spending an additional unit of the budget on incentivizing the ocial is equal to his marginal benet of impression management spending. Note that even when resources are unlimited, there is a maximum reward, R u 1 , that the agency head is willing to oer to the ocial, as he will prefer to extract any remaining resources above that reward level, due to diminishing returns to rewards oered. This maximum reward does not depend on the talent level, but only on the head's preference for extraction V , since once the task choice has been made, θ inuences only the probability of task completion. While more talented ocials might not be oered higher rewards, in expectation they will still earn more than ocials with lower θ, as they can produce a higher probability of task completion with the same eort.
To obtain some further insight into the head's strategy, rst consider the case when φ = 0, i.e. the head does not value opening cases for exposure only. The head's objective then reduces to maximizing
The agency head then compares the ratio of θ ψ A and θ ψ B , which are the terms by which the probability of the task's completion is scaled, with the factor by which completing task B is less worthwhile to society than completing task A. When the ocial's talent level θ increases, the more dicult task A becomes more attractive for the agency's head. 18 In other words, if the agency ocials are skilled enough, the agency will perform more dicult tasks. More dicult tasks will also be performed when the social benet from completing task A is suciently much higher than from completing the low-yielding task B. 19
The head's incentive to open high-prole cases for generating exposure (φ > 0) makes the more complex tasks generally more attractive to him. It is still true that a higher level of sta talent makes the more complex cases more attractive to the agency's head, but if impression management is important enough to him (i.e., either φ or V is very high), it becomes obsolete as a determinant 17 Here m ≤ n since n − m task were excluded from the set via the above mechanism. 18 As long as
, the agency head will prefer A when the ocial's talent level gets closer to 1, and B when θ goes to zero with no further restrictions on the parametrization. This will no longer be the case when φ = 0. With high enough φ the head might prefer task A for any ocial's talent level. 19 These results hold when the budget does not constrain. As will be derived later, with restrictions on the level of the rewards, it might be the head's optimal choice that the agency performs task B even if the ocial is very skilled. See Section 3.
of the agency's behavior. While without the incentive to ash high-prole cases the head's extraction plays no role in determining which task will be performed, with φ > 0 there is an interaction between the two motivations. Once φ or V become high enough, only complex tasks will be performed by the agency, irrespective of the ocial's talent, since the agency head expects to be able to extract a higher budget residue thanks to a lower probability of the ocial successfully completing complex tasks and the higher xed reward from exposure through the high-prole cases.
If the head does not value the mere opening of high-prole cases (φ = 0), and also values the budget residue just as society values its resources (V = 1), the agency head would incentivize pickup of those cases that maximize the expected returns from the agency's activities minus their expected We now turn to the role of the size of the budget that is at the agency head's discretion. Note that for any value of D above the head's optimal reward oer for his most preferred task, changes in D only inuence the head's utility through a dierent budget residue, not the optimal contract. However, once D falls below the head's optimal reward oer for his most preferred task, the agency may come to perform dierent tasks under dierent budget constraints, leading to discontinuities in social welfare.
To clarify how, we further focus on changes in the agency's performance when there are only two tasks, (ii) If Q B > Q A , so that the agency focuses on the simpler task B when the budget does not bind, there is always a critical value of D, D * 1 , above which the agency performs the simple task B and below which it performs the more dicult task A. 22 Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the agency's change in focus in (i.a) from the more dicult to the simpler task (when D falls below D * 2 ) for an interval of binding discretionary budgets is as follows. With enough budget, the head prefers to incentivize the more complex task.
non-binding high values, this rst starts inuencing the probability of completing the more complex task and the utility it generates for the head. Note that as soon as the budget is binding, the head will put it all towards rewarding his designated task (should it be completed successfully), rather than spread it between the ex ante reward and the impression management activities directly. As the budget is reduced further, the head suers two types of utility loss. One is from his inability to still suciently incentivize his sta to exert eort on completing the complex task to society's benet. The other is from reduced expected budget for impression management. At some point, the head then switches from stimulating the take up of the complex task to rewarding the simple task, which requires a lower reward to complete. However, when the budget is decreased further, below the head's most preferred reward for the simple task, the probability of completion of the simple task decreases further with it, since the ocial exerts less eort.
As the head's xed reward for opening a case, φd i , is constant, for low enough budget values it becomes the most important determinant of the agency's performance. For those low budget levels, the head will simply prefer the tasks with the highest xed reward just for opening them. In addition, the probability of the head actually paying the reward for completing the complex task is low, thus increasing his expected budget residue. This latter combination of eects also provides the intuition behind result (ii) in the proposition. The intermediate switch to the simpler task only happens when there is a moderate dierence between the tasks' benets, or a high dierence between the tasks' diculties, while the head is concerned primarily with social welfare. If these conditions are violated, the head cares too little about society's benets to mind the sure ineectiveness of trying to incentivize the complex task with too little budget. In other words, the head keeps pushing his sta to open complex high-prole cases, knowing they will most likely fail to complete them successfully, just to enjoy the exposure that such cases generate, while pocketing the unclaimed rewards for impression 21 This is with the exception of φ = 0, for which D * 1 = 0 and the agency performs task B for all budget values below With decreasing D, the head's utility generated by rewarding task A decreases at a higher rate than the utility from rewarding task B, which decreases with the slope V -which equals the head's marginal loss of resources to extract -up until the point D * 2 . Between D * 2 and D * 1 the head's utility is the highest for rewarding task B. As the budget decreases further, the xed reward for opening a task becomes relatively more important in determining head's utility just as in (ii), and the agency's head decides
There is a second intuition for the existence of D * 24 See the conditions derived in the proof to Proposition 1.
decrease, so does the head's opportunity to extract them for impression management. The lower probability of completing task A -i.e. the higher probability of extracting the whole budget -is no longer as attractive for the agency's head, as the total amount of money to be had is little. Instead, the agency's performance gains relatively higher importance in determining the head's overall utility, so that he may change the contract with the ocial to incentivizing task B below point D * 2 .
The less the head values impression management, the bigger will be the interval (D * 1 , D * 2 ). Opening complex tasks despite having insucient funds to induce the eort to complete them successfully still generates the exposure desired by the head. In addition, a lower probability of successful completion of the complex task increases the expected left-over budget that the head can put towards non-case specic activities. If the head cares only about real cases (V = 0 and φ = 0), the agency will perform the more complex task only when its ocials have high enough talent levels θ as compared to the dierence between the tasks' benets and diculties, and a high enough discretionary budget D.
Performing complicated tasks requires talent, combined with sucient resources to motivate those ocials skillful enough to perform them. In determining whether there will be a nonzero probability of completing task A, talent levels and the budget act as substitutes. However, the extent of this substitutability is limited. Higher (lower) D always means that lower (higher) talent levels are needed in order for the agency to perform task A. The opposite is not always the case. Some talent values can make the budget constraint irrelevant as a determinant of the type of task performed -however not the extent by which it is performed, i.e. the probability of completion. If θ
if the ocial's talent is close to zero, only task B will be performed for any budget value. Similarly, if the ocial's talent level is close to one, only task A is performed and there is no budget interval in which the agency shifts to the simpler task B. In this sense, talent availability is more important in determining the type of task the agency performs than the budget assigned.
Welfare Implications of the Agency's Focus Changes
The head's switches between incentivizing high-prole and basic cases do not generally serve society's interest. While the social welfare gains from handling cases and those from impression management spending will both be hard to quantify with much precision in practice, the latter even more so than the former, there is no reason to think they would generally be the same. In general, the net benets to social welfare of impression management spending are ambiguous. Self-presentation towards building the organization's public image is a delicate exercise. On the one hand may public appearances create a wider public awareness of the agency, its interventions and the rules it enforces. A public image of a strong agency certainly is likely to help compliance with the rules it oversees. On the other hand, public signaling can just as well have negative eects. It could fuel suspicion of the agency being politically bound, poorly informed or myopically focused, for example, making the agency loose grip on its regulatees. A published sector study, criminal prole, or a code red warning, while possibly impressing the general public, can also give away crucial information about the agency's thinking to the initiated. Intended to come across authoritative and well-informed, such communications may reveal what the agency's blank spots are as well.
25 In addition, zealously visible agency activity may lead to over-deterrence when perfectly ne activities are curbed for fear of being mistaken for a violation that would trigger an intervention and possibly sanctions.
In this section, we study how social welfare is inuenced by the agency's focus changes resulting from changes in D. For simplicity, we analyze the case in which impression management on balance does not benet society. The qualitative results carry through generally when relaxing this assumption, as discussed at the end of this section. Under the assumption that budget not spent on cases generates no welfare, expected social welfare net from spending D is:
All tasks that the agency has not picked up have a probability of completion equal to zero. Note that this particular formulation of the social welfare function reects the assumption made earlier that the entire budget is spent by the agency, i.e. no residue is returned to society. In addition, for analytical convenience we imply that the head's and the ocial's private utilities are negligible in total welfare, which amounts to assuming that as individuals they are atomistic in society.
In principle, given perfect information about the functional forms and the values of θ, ∀i : (d i , ψ i ),φ, V , γ -plus the gains from impression management when there are any -it is possible to determine the social welfare maximizing budget level in any given case. It seems unrealistic, however, to assume that the budget-setter would have all of this knowledge. It is therefore more interesting to study the welfare implications of a range of possible budgets -including those that would be socially optimal.
Doing so reveals, amongst other things, that a change in the budget often aects welfare by more than just the resources allocated.
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While the agency head's utility is continuous in the assigned budget, social welfare is not. The head switches between rewarding one task and the other only at point(s) D * , where his utility from the two reward schedules is equal. Welfare changes discretely then, with those task switches. Consider Figure 2 , which continues the two task example set up above, for which social welfare reduces to:
where i is the task rewarded by the agency head and pursued by the ocial. 27 When the budget is non-binding, social welfare declines at a rate proportional to resources spent, since any additional 25 See Schinkel (2011) on the interaction between market overseers and their overseen being a strategic game of catand-mouse, in which the question is who outsmarts who. 26 We return to the problem of budget-setting under incomplete information in Section 6. 27 In the example in this gure, parameter values are the same as in Figure 1 .
resources provided to the agency are extracted by its head.
Social welfare is linear in the probabilities of task completion, so that it is a linear function of the budget whenever the two probabilities are linear in the budget, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Note that while the agency head always sets at least one of the rewards for the task completion higher than zero as long as there is a positive budget, society might be better o by not rewarding any of the tasks and simply keeping the discretionary budget instead. This is the case when the ocial's costs of eort are very high compared to the tasks' benets and diculty, so that the expected social benets of the agency's discretionary activities do not justify the investment by society in additional rewards.
Incentivizing an ocial with high γ comes at a high price to society, yet not to the agency's head, who wants to oer nonzero rewards for task completion, irrespective of the ocial's costs, since lower eort caused by higher γ translates into higher expected residual budget for the head to spend. In addition, the head prefers the opening of high-prole cases for show. While this may suggest that it is optimal to further increase the budget, in fact a discrete welfare increase can be had by slightly decreasing the budget over D * 2 . While moving away from the global maximum, this budget cut increases welfare through a decrease in the head's incentive to extract resources. Obviously, better is a large budget increase far towards, or best at, maximum welfare at R u A , but when that is not attainable, society may gain more from a budget cut than too small an increase. Finally, note that a discretionary budget squeezed below D * 1 gives the head an incentive to just open high-prole cases.
Proposition 2 generalizes the results, establishing that the jumps in welfare always go in a predetermined direction.
Proposition 2. If a small budget cut occurs and the budget falls below any critical budget value
such that the agency's focus shifts: (i) from the complex task to a simpler one, social welfare discontinuously increases. 28 The inverse is also true: a small budget increase bringing D above such D * reduces welfare -even if D is still below its welfare-maximizing level.
(ii) from a simple task to a more complex one, social welfare discontinuously decreases. 29 The inverse is also true: a small budget increase bringing D above such D * improves welfare. Proof. See Appendix.
The agency head will design contracts leading to higher (lower) probability of completion of the complex (simple) tasks than would be society's preference, since these tasks have lower (higher) probability of being successfully completed upon an ocial's attempt, and the head receives higher xed rewards from them. The wedge between the head's preferred and the socially optimal contract is due to the head's taste for impression management. Social welfare is discontinuous precisely at the points where the agency head switches between the contract designs. In Figure 2 , there is a jump in welfare at points D * 1 and D * 2 , since the agency head decides to stop rewarding the complex task when the budget drops below the critical value D * 2 , yet reopens the task once D drops below D * 1 . Importantly, the jumps in social welfare caused by the change in the head's strategy can be of a very substantial size -around half of total welfare in our example. The size of the jump at point D * 1 in Figure 2 is
, every time there is a shift between tasks A and B for budget values below R u B .
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If we assume that the part of the budget that is spent on non-case specic activities does generate welfare, our general ndings carry through, with some adjustments. agency's behavior remains unaected by any change in the social welfare function and the generated welfare increases by a constant φ S d i , dependent on the cases being performed under the given budget.
In addition, for the parts of the budget where complex cases are being performed, this constant has a higher value. The social welfare function in Figure 2 shifts up by φ S d i , more for the intervals where
. Immediately then the size of the discontinuous jumps decreases. As long as society values the impression management utility from opening tasks less than the agency's head (φ S < φ), the existence and sign of the jumps remains unchanged. 31
Second, the discontinuity of welfare in D remains also when impression management nanced by the discretionary budget spent on non case-specic activities is valued by society at V S . Social welfare would then have the form Similarly, the discontinuity of welfare in D remains also when any budget residue would be returned to society -somehow: as discussed in the introduction, bureaucracies tend to exhaust their resources and spend budget surplus to avoid future budget cuts. Social welfare would then be
still leaving a wedge between the head's and society's dis-utility of paying the ocial. This dierence remains for the arguably more likely head's objective function E[U H ] = p i d i + φd i , which reects that the budget residue is not at the head's discretion and therefore V = 0. In the unlikely opposite scenario φ S > φ, the sign of the jump depends also on the head's (and society's) valuation of the discretionary budget spent on non case-specic activities.
32 For φ S > φ and V S > V , the jumps go in the opposite direction. The remaining cases are ambiguous and depend on other parameter values. 34 Clearly, the existence of asymmetries between actual welfare eects of cases and their public perception can have deeply detrimental eects with agency heads concerned with impression management.
Agency with Several Ocials and Multiple Tasks
The main insights derived from the basic model above extend straightforwardly to an agency employing a number of ocials and having several types of tasks that it can perform in addition to its regular duties, under the following three assumptions. First, we assume that contracts can be individualized and the head can fully discriminate among his ocials. This is in line with the examples of secondary and tertiary personal rewards given above, as well as with the assumption that the agency head has perfect information about his sta 's qualities. Second, if two ocials perform one and the same type of task, their probabilities of task completion are independent, i.e. there is no interaction or economies of scale or scope -which can be thought of as each ocial individually working on a dierent task of 33 Assume d the same type. Third, interpreting the discretionary budget as an administrative constraint on the head's rewarding options, we assume that it is an upper limit on the reward for each ocial -that is, in case the agency employs m ocials, the head uses up to 1/m of the total discretionary resources to motivate each ocial. At the end of this section, we briey discuss why alternative specications, while introducing considerable complexity of analysis, do not change our results qualitatively.
In this setup, the mechanics of the head's switching between the available tasks remains unchanged, including the formulas for critical values of budget.
35 The head's most preferred task for each ocial without a binding budget is given by Lemma 2. The main dierence when more tasks are available to the agency is that there can be more critical values of the budget at which the head switches the agency's focus, as these can happen among multiple pairs of tasks for dierent budget values.
One of these tasks will still be more dicult and yield higher benets upon completion.
36 The head always has one preferred task for the ocial to perform for a given budget value, and the changes in priorities are always between two tasks, just as described in Proposition 2. Moreover, the intuition of Proposition 1(ii) directly implies that for the lowest budget values the head will always incentivize the most complex tasks, as they have the highest xed reward for opening. Only if φ = 0 will the agency perform continuously simpler tasks as the discretionary budget depletes towards D = 0. For an agency with k ocials and n tasks to choose from, there are between 0 and k × n jumps in performance, as the head's level of discretion decreases. 
For each budget interval, sta might get "assigned" to a dierent task via the contract design. The contracts oered to each of the two ocials and the resulting tasks picked up are still governed by Lemma 2 and Proposition 1.
In our
35 See proof to Proposition 1 in the Appendix. 36 See the discussion of task domination in Section 2.2.1 37 For each ocial, there can be up to n − 1 jumps from the more dicult task to simpler tasks, as well as in addition, for the lowest budget values, a jump back to the most complex task with the highest xed reward for opening a case. 38 In the example in the gure, parameter values are: 60, 25, 20) ; γ = 5; V = 1; φ = 0.05. The head uses half of the budget on each ocial, that is D 1 = D 2 . Note that in this example, there is a dierence between the tasks' benets as society perceives them, and the actual welfare that these tasks generate upon successful completion. The perceived benets enter the head's utility function, while the actual benets determine the social welfare as discussed in Section 4. Similar gures can be constructed in which the two sets of benets coincide, much like in Figures 1 and 2. 39 Lemma 2 determines the task that will be picked up by the ocial when the budget constraint is not binding. Take the ocial O 1 and the most complex task he can perform, A. The critical budget values derived in the proof to Proposition 1 then determine whether a simpler task will be performed for some budget constraints -we know that task A will be performed for the lowest budget values as well. However, there are now up to six possible critical budget values instead of just two: a jump from task A to task B, from A to C, from B to C, and each of them back. Their ordering determines which task will be performed for a particular budget value. There can be an interval in which task B is preferred over task A, an interval in which task C is preferred over task B, and an interval in which task C is preferred over task B. For instance, the ocial O 1 could perform task A for the highest and lowest budget values and task C for some intermediate values without ever performing task B. This would happen if the interval in which B is preferred example, both ocials are oered contracts that induce them to perform the most complex task from their portfolio when the discretionary budget constraint is non-binding, and are gradually pushed to tasks with a lower level of complexity when the discretionary reward that a the head can oer goes down.
40 For the lowest ranges of D i , it becomes worthwhile for the head to make every ocial pick the most complex task, even those that are not cut out for them, because of the head's incentive to open cases for exposure. For low enough budgets, impression management, rather than productivity of the ocial, becomes the most important determinant of what is being rewarded by the agency's head. 40 This is a result of the parametrization that we have chosen for our numerical example. It is plausible to construct examples where ocials are induced to perform only one type of task or just a few of them. For instance substantially increasing the talent level of ocial O 1 would make him skilled enough so that the agency's head would make him perform task A no matter the budget constraint. 41 In the example in the gure, parameter values are the same as in Figure 4 .
to the detriment of social welfare.
For budgets above R u A , prioritizing the complex task A generates negative welfare, since incentivizing it serves the head's personal preferences for impression management, but this type of task is too complex for society's good.
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The much higher benets that would materialize upon its completion cannot oset the low probability of success for this hard task. Similarly, the social benets from task X are decreasing in resources above R u X , where the reward for ocial O 2 reaches it's cap, below zero for large enough budgets. Social welfare can also be negative for low or intermediate budget values.
In such cases, society would be better o dismantling the agency altogether, rather than getting the discretionary budget constraint wrong.
The absolute size of the welfare jump discontinuities is governed by the same formula as in the case of one ocial choosing between two tasks only, yet each jump is smaller relative to overall welfare, because generically each is caused by a single ocial switching between tasks, while the others remain on theirs. The fact that in the case of a still relatively simple agency the number of local maxima of the welfare function generated by the discretionary spending is already large underscores the importance of considering task prioritization when devising the budgeting policy by any agency's superiors. For agencies with more ocials and tasks, the jumps become less pronounced, but the overall welfare function is in general not monotonous. 
The diculty of task A is set to generate zero social welfare up to R u A when performed by a ocial with talent level θ O 1 , so that all welfare on intervals where task A is performed comes from the activity of the ocial O 2 .
As the number of ocials rises, the welfare eect of individual jumps becomes less pronounced, but there is likely to be more of them. More tasks aects the agency's behavior depending on their characteristics relative to the existing portfolio. Adding a simplest task or a task of intermediate diculty may have no eect at all. Adding a new task that is more complex and benecial than any existing one always has an eect on both the tasks being picked up and welfare, since it will be performed by all ocials for the lowest budget values, and may be performed by the most talented ocials for other budget values. If tasks of intermediate diculty and yield are added, the size of the welfare jumps might decrease, for example because some jumps among tasks with very diering characteristics can be replaced by two smaller-sized jumps among similar tasks.
A full continuum of available tasks with diering characteristics eectively attens out the welfare function, in the sense that at every point of the budget constraint there is a innitesimal small jump and each task is performed only for a specic budget value.
43 Note that still in that case task switching determines welfare, in the sense that neglecting the head's changes of mind will underestimate the eects from discretionary budget changes -discretely so for any nite number of tasks as soon as the budget is moved over a jump discontinuity threshold. Since each discontinuity is eectively the result of one (or more) ocials being incentivized to perform a dierent task, the jumps will be aected by introducing society's nonzero valuation of the impression management in the same manner as in Section 4. The sign of the jumps remains unchanged, as long as the agency's head gains some utility from the impression management in addition to its welfare generating eects. The size of the jumps then again depends on the wedge between society's and the head's valuation of these activities.
Finally, consider variations of the three simplifying assumptions made at the beginning of this section. Should, for legal reasons for example, the agency have to oer all, or classes of its ocials the same incentive contracts, so that the head cannot exercise full discretion in awarding his sta, he could still write one or several universal contracts that include cut-o values in the reward structure.
Eectively, ocials with talent in certain intervals would choose to perform certain tasks. Because of the incentive constraints, the agency's head might then have to leave information rents to some ocials in order to induce them to perform certain tasks. Yet the main results carry through. The same is true for allowing ocials to jointly work on a case and so aect its probability of successful completion. This would highly complicate the analysis, yet still return abrupt shifts in performance caused by changing the budget to the head's discretion. Finally, the budget constraint could be modeled alternatively as the maximum total money spent if every ocial who is oered a reward is successful in completing its task. If such reallocation of resources among ocials becomes part of the head's decision space, the model dynamics would change substantially, since a change in the budget can then amount to changes in any number of contracts between the head and the ocials, and the agency head would get to decide for which ocials or tasks the budget is eectively (non)binding. Again, while considerably 43 Do note that it cannot simply be the case that doubles (d i , ψ i ) cover the whole R 2 + , since then the task with ψ = 0 and d = ∞ would dominate all others and always be chosen by the head. A continuum of tasks could instead look for 6 Optimal Discretionary Authority Society employs the agency head for his expertise. Yet while the head's private information about his sta 's best talent-task matches gives him the ability to maximize his agency's contribution to social welfare, his personal tastes for self-presentation through non-case-specic activities with less obvious social benets means he has to be kept in check. Apart from appointing a head whose incentives are closest to the public interest, society has the budget part over which it gives the head discretion, D, to do so. The political decision on a government agency's budget is two-fold: it concerns the agency's total budget, as well as its division between the non-discretionary part and the discretionary part D.
To the extent that this division is determined outside the agency, it denes the discretionary space of the agency's head. While an authority's budget-setter is unlikely to have the information required to determine D socially optimally, there are several qualitative insights to go by.
The socially optimal split of the total budget depends crucially on the welfare that is generated by generic tasks, relative to what can be obtained in addition through discretionary spending. Let F be the part of the generic budget in which welfare is smooth, including expenses for work facilities and support sta, as well as xed wages for regular agency's activities that are readily assigned by law and require no special expertise beyond the common agency standard of professionalism or prioritizing, such as common random inspections to monitor compliance. For any agency that is socially productive, it seems reasonable to assume that the welfare function in generic resources spent on regular agency activities is concave, without discontinuities and with a maximum above which the marginal benet of funding the agency's generic tasks is lower than its marginal costs. Suppose that F has diminishing returns to society, that is, let net welfare as a function of F be W F (F ), strictly concave with a maximum at point F =F .
The optimal division between D and F , given a xed total budget, then depends on the shape of the welfare function generated by the discretionary spending, relative to the shape of the welfare function generated by the performance of the generic task. A budget-setter with perfect information about the shape of both of the (expected) welfare functions W D (D) and W F (F ) would in principle want to divide any budget total so that the marginal welfares generated by the two budget chapters are equalized. There are two caveats to this. First, such a split might not exist due to the discontinuities in the welfare function of the discretionary spending. In that case, the division should be made so that the discretionary funds are kept on the correct side of the jumps as discussed in Section 4, and the rest of the funds is assigned to the performance of the generic tasks. Second, equating the marginal welfare gains is not sucient for attaining the optimal division, since W D is non-monotonous and typically has several local maxima. A welfare-maximizing division of a given total budget thus has to be determined on a case-by-case basis, requiring immense information about the agency's inner workings, it's various tasks and the characteristics of those people performing them -exactly the type of information only a head would have and a government would hire him for. Figure 5 provides a graphical illustration of the problem faced by the budget-setter for the baseline case in which the non-case specic spending is unproductive. Suppose rst that he has perfect information. The optimal total budget and the optimal budget split are simply found using the global maxima of both W D and W F . The socially optimal total budget isF +D and the socially optimal budget division is F =F and D =D. If that optimal total budget is not available, the optimal split in Figure 5 can be determined as follows. For very low values of the total budget F + D, all funds should be channeled to the generic task performance because of its higher marginal welfare, i.e. W F (0) > W D (0). There is no point in allocating any resources to the discretionary task performance lower than D 1 , but that does not mean that it will be nanced as soon as F + D ≥ D 1 . Specically, if there are just enough funds to induce the agency's head to promote the performance of task B (i.e. F + D is just enough to attain the rst jump in the discretionary performance), all funds should still be used to nance the generic task since it generates higher welfare. In fact, all funds should be allocated to the generic task's budget F as long as (F + D) ∈ (0, F 1 + D 1 ). F 1 in Figure 5 is dened as the value of F for which D) ), i.e. the marginal welfare gain of additional investment in F equals the slope of the discretionary tasks' welfare function on it's interval (D 1 ,D) -the linear part after the rst jump. With the budget total reaching F + D = F 1 + D 1 , a perfectly informed budget-setter abruptly cuts D 1 from the resources allocated to the performance of the generic task T and start nancing also the discretionary tasks' performance. For any total budget in the interval (F + D) ∈ (F 1 + D 1 , F 1 +D), the optimal budget division is F = F 1 and D the remainder. The discretionary budget is thus nanced until W D (D) reaches it's maximum, with the generic task nancing being constant at F = F 1 . Finally, for total budget (F + D) ∈ (F 1 +D,F +D), the optimal split is D =D and F the remainder. Note that this is but one example of solving the budget-setter's problem with given total resources and using the welfare functions given in Figure 5 , but other scenario's are analogous. Now consider a budget-setter with imperfect information. While the rst-best budget division will generally be out of reach in this case, some information about the ocials' costs or an estimate of the head's preference for impression management, together with the knowledge of W F , can go a long way in setting a reasonably good level of discretion. A strong preference for impression management implies that the maximum incentive contract rewards will be relatively low, speaking for narrowing the discretionary space. At the same time there may be a negative impact of tightening the head's discretionary budget too much, since it can edge him towards having high-prole cases being pursued unsuccessfully for the exposure they generate. Overall, the jump discontinuities in W D remain the prime determinants of the optimal division of the budget, but the budget-setter is unlikely to have full knowledge of W D .
If the agency's superiors have limited information about the shapes of W F and W D , the question who should determine the budget total and the budget's division gains relevance, and it comes down to the characteristics of the agency's head. A fully benevolent agency head would himself promote the optimal budget division and assign appropriate funds to generic tasks as their performance also enters his utility function. A partially benevolent agency's head with preference for discretionary spending might still allocate part of the resources to the generic tasks' performance, depending on his relative utility gain from the agency's welfare generation and advancement of his private goals via less productive discretionary spending. Whether or not the agency's head should then be allowed to determine the budget division depends both on the quality of the budget-setter's information about the head's motivations and about the shapes of W F and W D . Both how much discretionary space a given agency head should have, and whether he should be able to partially determine the extent of it himself, all depends on the level of alignment between the head's motivations and society's interests.
Moreover, in determining the discretionary space of the agency head, the budget-setter can limit the extraction of resources, but thereby also reduces the benets from the head's superior information on how to incentivize the ocials. If impression management activities would also generate welfare, the heuristics of nding the optimal total budget and optimal budget division do not change, even though the shape of W D is altered. The more social benets come from impression management, the more discretionary space and inuence over the budget split the agency's head should be given.
Concluding Remarks
This paper oers a formal model to study task prioritization under a binding budget constraint in government agencies with multiple tasks to be picked up by sta with varying talent that is managed by a head who balances several interests. We nd that the size of the agency's discretionary budget inuences not only the scale, but also the type of tasks it will engage in. Social welfare is non-monotonic and discontinuous in the agency's budget. Small changes in the budget over certain thresholds may cause extensive restructuring from major to minor tasks, or vice versa. For lower binding budgets, the head continues to sub-optimally incentivize work on complex tasks, when the agency should have shifted down to simpler tasks. Looking locally at marginal welfare can give a budget-setter the wrong idea about socially optimal budget changes. Budget cuts can increase welfare more than too little extra budget would, whereas a substantially higher budget would be socially optimal. By determining the size of the discretionary space of the agency head, the budget-setting body can indirectly control the type of tasks being pursued.
Our ndings underline the importance of socially optimal institutional design and budgeting for government agencies. Policymakers should consider not only the eects of budget changes on the scale of the agency's activities, but also the type. In that, the size of the discretionary budget is a control tool with important welfare implications. Discussion about which tasks and tools to make available to a government agency should not be separate from determining the resources it will have at its disposal.
They are complementary, both directly and indirectly. Moreover, the optimal sets of tasks and tools for an agency are subject to such realities as availability of skilled sta, means of secondary and tertiary performance rewards, and the interests of the agency's head.
Any agency superior, in rst instance usually a Ministry, should be aware of its crucial role in tasking its agencies. To a government that has to save a certain amount across dierent agencies, our model suggests that these cuts be allocated where there is a bigger chance for a higher welfare jump upwards -i.e. where agencies have taken on high-prole cases too ambitious for their limited means.
In practice, however, it will be dicult to tell how close to a welfare jump any given agency is, and so what would be optimal cuts and reassignments. In addition, in many agency practices the truly discretionary budget is stochastic, as high-priority cases -be it a terrorism threat, a tax scandal, or a merger notication -present themselves unannounced and then must be dealt with.
One possible instrument to better control priorities is to compartmentalize the discretionary budget, earmarking parts for designated classes of cases. To do so to improve welfare, however, requires a considerable amount of information that budget-setters typically would not have. While requirements on an agency to return left-over budget appear appealing to impose, they may not be eective either.
Even if government were able to tell what amount of the budget was not spent on which cases, the return requirement would lead to rewards going up, as the head would no longer care about a residue and rather spend the entire budget. This might lead to a dierent type of wasteful spending, even though the incentives of the agency's head are now more aligned with society's interests. Moreover, the head's instantaneous incentive to open up high-prole cases for impression management purposes remains.
Another possible institutional design element that could help counter the head's urge to extract budget is to feed back part of the revenues from nes imposed by the agency directly into its budget.
Doing so introduces another set of potentially perverse incentive problems, pushing for priorities for picking low hanging fruits with little social harm, if not fostering a steady crop of violations to harvest later on. Yet, it would in principle counter the head's inclination to spend resources on cases that are a likely loss for their short-run impression management features. The more indirect feedback from agency success into budget increases may be a better instrument for curbing excessive impression management.
At the same time do our ndings reveal how both institutional design and budget can be used to pursue political goals or promote private interests. By either steeply reducing the budget or, instead, over-nancing the agency, its focus of attention can be shifted from low-risk welfare increasing tasks to high-prole cases that will ultimately fail. Similar eects follow from extending the spectrum of tasks the agency is made responsible for, without also oering a matching budget. Parliaments better control their governments not to abuse these mechanisms, when they value the independence of their government agencies.
To return to our lead example of competition authorities, one structural form of reorganization of agencies is institutional mergers. In the U.S., the debate on merging the DoJ's Antitrust Division with the FTC into one competition authority has been long, yet rather academic. In Europe, meanwhile, several Member State authorities, including those in the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Spain, have recently gone through extensive institutional reorganizations, that also included mergers with other agencies such as sector regulators and consumer authorities. An emerging literature studies the eectiveness of such institutional changes for market oversight by looking at the costs of the merger itself versus merger specic eciencies in eliminating dual enforcement and expected gains from complementarities, the importance of a unied mission, and eects from regulatory competition lost.
44 Our formalized approach adds the importance of the interaction between the combined talent pools and resources of the previously separate agencies, together with the new head's objectives, in determining the emphases that the merged agency will lay in the execution of its enlarged set of tasks. While there may be synergies in enforcement, an institutional merger can result in the more expertise and resource demanding duties being largely abandoned, if the two original agencies diered suciently in their tasks and talent pools, so that the smaller new budget is channeled to incentivize mostly simple basis cases, at the expense of the complex major tasks. Such a shift in the agency's performance is accompanied by a sudden unanticipated increase in social welfare. On the other hand, the head can possibly use the joined discretionary budgets across the merged agencies to increase a 44 See Crane (2011) and Blumenthal (2013) .
reward for a particular set of tasks, while decreasing other rewards, to ambiguous welfare eects. Our model can advise on the types of tasks that would be best combined under one roof.
A number of extensions of our analysis present themselves. A public agency might be able to inuence the skill level of its employees through recruitment, training and on the job skill growth. Sta quality is also endogenous in the sense that an agency that continuously does menial work will loose high quality sta and cannot hire better, whereas in a challenging institutional environment, the quality of work may spiral up, as the agency attracts talented ocials. The quality of the agency's talent pool directly aects its responsiveness to incentives and hence budget changes. A fuller model would include endogenous dynamics, as well as choices on human resources management within the agency as part of the head's discretionary space. Increasing talent need not necessarily be benecial: while within-case productivity may go up, in addition to the cost of training, the head may stimulate the more complex tasks more, leading to ambiguous welfare eects. Also, the head need not necessarily have the best intentions in this respect either: depending on his preferences and the agency's circumstances, the head may prefer a sta that is below the socially optimal standard -which he can cheaply induce to take on complex cases it will not be able to complete successfully.
One possible institutional safeguard against an agency head's preferences dictating his agency's priorities is to install an executive committee or board to lead the agency instead of a single head, which is often the case. While this would introduce extra complexities of joint decision making, there is a priori no reason to think that some members of such a committee would have strong motivations to counter a typical head's incentives -after all, they are all in the same position now. As long as suciently many committee members would value impression management activities for the agency, our basic results remain. In principle, the same is true for more complex multi-layered organizations, with division heads and a central agency head, although some of the personal gains from impression management are to be split among the committee members. While interesting questions about countervailing arguments in delegating arise, the type of ndings we obtain seems rather robust. Likewise would a fuller description of the agent as a case-handling team of ocials enrich our analysis.
The non-monotonicity of the welfare function in the budget is related to the limited set of cases of certain discrete sizes that the agency can choose from. A more continuous set of tasks for each ocial to perform can smoothen the welfare function. Yet a policymaker will still likely over-or underestimate the welfare impact of a budget change on the upper welfare envelope parts where shifts towards less complex tasks occur with a budget cut. Moreover, while the nature of the tasks performed by the type of government agencies considered in this paper is that they are discrete and of a certain, and typically large, minimum size, to that each task commits a chunk of resources to complete once opened, more cooperative types of enforcement, such as settlements, may also reduce the sizes of the jumps.
Following public prosecutors plea bargaining in criminal cases, competition authorities increasingly seek to settle cartel cases, or obtain commitments. By eectively reducing the resources and time that need to be committed to a case, settlements make it possible to pursue more cases with the same overall budget and same number of sta. To accommodate such a scenario, our model could be extended to ocials that can pick up more that one task and split their eort among them. This may reduce the sizes of the welfare jumps at agency focus shift points, in a similar way as adding more ocials into the baseline setup does, but will not eliminate them. The discontinuities will become less pronounced, as each task's performance constitutes a lower share of the total expected welfare. Yet, some level case discretion will always remain, as settlements still require extensive case preparation.
Our results are obtained for a head who has perfect information about his ocials' talents. A natural extension is to assume that the talent level is private information of the ocial and the agency head knows only the ex ante talent distribution. Under asymmetric information, our qualitative ndings remain. It implies that the individualized contract oered to an ocial is driven by the head's expected utility of the ocial's choice of tasks multiplied by their respective probabilities of being performed. In a setting with one dicult and one basic task, the agency head uses the contract design to set a "cut-o value" of the draw from the ocial's talent distribution above which the ocial chooses to perform the dicult task, and below which he performs the basic task. The ocial thus ex ante performs each task with some probability. If the budget is binding, this comes at a cost: in order to satisfy the incentive constraint of an ocial with a high talent draw, the reward for the basic task has to be set below the head's desired level. The dierence increases as the discretionary budget becomes tighter, because the ocial with high talent draw is rewarded less and less optimally from the head's point of view. Once this cost becomes higher than the head's utility of having the ocials with higher talent draws perform the more dicult task, the agency's head stops rewarding the complex task altogether and increases the reward for the simple task, because he is no longer bound by the ex ante incentive constraint of the ocial. This will generate a jump in the probability of performing each task and a discontinuity in the social welfare function. Moreover, if the agency's head gains nonzero utility from opening a big case, there will be a shift towards performing complex tasks for the lowest budget values, just as in the model without information asymmetry. Introducing the information asymmetry thus changes the critical budget values, but the main message of the model holds: the head's switching between task types creates discontinuities in the social welfare function. Moreover, agency performance remains suboptimal when the head gains utility from socially less productive impression management.
Another ready extension is asymmetric information about the characteristics of the available taskstheir complexity and the benets they bring to society and the agency's head. We assume an "expert" agency head who has perfect information about the agency's possible undertakings. If he has not, a wedge is driven between formal and real authority in the agency, similar to that in Aghion & Tirole (1997) . While the head retains the formal authority -that is, the right to overrule the ocial's selection of the task to perform -the ocials would have a real authority over the task pickup, whenever some level of authority delegation is optimal for the agency's head, for example when the costs of obtaining the relevant information is too high. In our basic setup, the ocial's private benets of task completion were set at zero, for simplicity of analysis. If instead there is a dierence between the private benets of the tasks' completion of the head and those of the ocial, and the ocials have private information about the tasks' characteristics, the eects of the agency's prioritization with a shift in the discretionary budget assignment are ambiguous. The head is bound by the incentive constraint of the ocial, unless he can discover the relevant information himself -at a cost. Should these costs be too high for some types of tasks, the head may stop rewarding them as feasible missions completely. This would eectively decrease the number of tasks in the ocial's choice set, and amount to more abrupt shifts in the agency's performance and the resulting welfare. Alternatively, the agency's head may need to leave the better informed ocial a rent in order to satisfy his incentive constraint, possibly resulting in a less ecient allocation of resources. Finally, our model can be extended to the political economy of budget assignment, focusing on the relationship between the head and his (direct and indirect) superiors, politicians, who have their own incentives. We noted that politicians may abuse the agency budget to steer its task take-up.
One possible reason for a politician to may want to do so is to please his constituency. A lobby from industry with the responsible Ministry against the competition authority's perceived aggression on discovering and sanctioning cartels may result in either budget cuts or enlargements -depending on where the agency is on the case type spectrum. Another mechanism is to modify the head's incentives by changing the criteria by which he will be assessed. On the other hand, the head has tools to inuence public opinion, which also interests politicians. Through impression management, the head can produce public support, which may translates into pressure on politicians to enlarge the agency's budget.
The roots of the quadratic equation are
There will be a switch among the performed tasks for these budget values if they fall in the (0, R 
